

Peasants and Local Communities: from Cartagena to Yerevan

A criticism well founded in the Convention on Biological Diversity and wrongly
transposed to UNDROP

By Carlos Duarte





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On 28 February 2026, at the closing session of the Second International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, held in Cartagena de Indias, Indigenous Peoples and the social movements gathered in the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty rejected the declaration adopted by governments. The reason was terminological. In their own political declaration they wrote a sentence that repays slow reading: “the concept of local communities and its conflation with Indigenous Peoples is an unacceptable attack against the rights of Indigenous Peoples”.²

The sentence cuts in two directions. It condemns the conflation, which is what anyone following the debate of the past years would expect, and it also condemns the concept itself. The paradox becomes visible the moment one notices who signed it: among the signatories are the same peasant organizations whose own international instrument carries that expression in article 1, paragraph 3.

That instrument is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, UNDROP, adopted in 2018. Its article 1(3) provides that the Declaration “also applies to indigenous peoples and local communities working on the land, transhumant, nomadic and semi-nomadic communities, and the landless engaged in the above-mentioned activities”.³

¹ Anthropologist, PhD in sociology, professor at the Institute of Intercultural Studies of the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Cali, and member of the United Nations Working Group on the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas. This paper is written in a personal capacity.



Over the past months I have seen that clause invoked, in multilateral forums and in position papers, as evidence that UNDROP dilutes the legal specificity of Indigenous Peoples.

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What I hold is that the criticism of the use of “local communities” is correct and necessary within the international biodiversity regime, and mistaken when it is transposed to UNDROP. The reason lies in the fact that one and the same formula performs two different normative functions. In article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity the formula constitutes a holder: it names the subject of a regime on traditional knowledge and benefit sharing, a subject defined by its ecological function and endowed with no catalogue of rights of its own. In article 1(3) of UNDROP the formula constitutes no holder at all; it identifies addressees, which is to say it delimits who an instrument reaches, an instrument whose rights are attributed, article by article, to peasants and other people working in rural areas. The difference becomes tangible the moment one attempts deletion. Removing the formula from article 8(j) would force the drafter to name, one by one, each of the collectives currently bundled under it, which is precisely what needs to be done. Removing it from article 1(3) would add not a single guarantee for Indigenous Peoples, already shielded by the savings clause of article 28(1), and would leave outside the reach of UNDROP those rural collectives that work the land without identifying themselves either as peasants or as Indigenous.

This working paper is written two months before the seventeenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which will convene in Yerevan, and at the moment when the permanent subsidiary body on article 8(j), established in Cali, begins to operate.

The distinction I propose is not a desk refinement. It aims to offer a working tool for deciding what can be asked for in a negotiating room without damaging the neighbour's instrument. I should make clear that I write in a personal capacity, and that nothing here engages my esteemed colleagues of the Working Group on the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas of the United Nations special procedures.



1.

WHERE THE CRITICISM IS RIGHT

alongside “Indigenous Peoples”.⁴

In August 2025 the Special Rapporteur Albert K. Barume devoted his first report to the Human Rights Council to the recognition of Indigenous Peoples and described the merging of categories as inaccurate and dangerous, observing that almost twenty years after the 2007 Declaration the lack of understanding of the term “Indigenous Peoples” continues to constrain its implementation, particularly in Africa and Asia.⁵

Anyone who has followed land litigation in Africa recognizes at once the problem Barume describes. When a State maintains that its territory contains no Indigenous Peoples but only local communities, what it is doing is closing off, through vocabulary, access to self-determination, to territory and to consent.

The Endorois case shows this with a clarity no doctrinal argument achieves. Kenya gazetted the Lake Bogoria area as a game reserve in 1973 and told the community that it had to leave its historic lands en bloc. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights had to settle a preliminary question first, namely whether the Endorois were a people holding the collective rights of articles 20 to 24 of the African Charter or merely a set of residents of an area, and only then could it reach the merits.⁶ A conservation project displaced a community, and the community had to litigate for years over the noun by which it was named. This is not a minor matter.

The organization Land Is Life summarized the argument in ten reasons in 2024, and the second carries the most weight: no international instrument yet defines specific rights for “local communities” as a category.⁷ The observation is exact on the terrain where it is made. What I want to show is that this terrain is not the only one, and that since 2018 UNDROP has occupied part of that void for rural collectives that work the land.

There is a further point, the strongest one available to the opposing position, which the discussion tends to pass over and which is worth putting on the table before going on. The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework extended, in target 21, free, prior and informed con-



sent to the traditional knowledge, innovations, practices and technologies “of indigenous peoples and local communities”, and target 22 recognizes for that same pairing rights over lands, territories, resources and traditional knowledge.⁸ One of the guarantees hardest won by Indigenous Peoples in international law ended up attributed, in a global policy instrument, to a category the regime itself never defined. The objection raised by the indigenous mechanisms has its firmest ground there, and I do not intend to contest it.

The objection deserves to be stated fairly before it is answered, because it is not made on the plane where it is usually met. When the indigenous mechanisms warn against conflation they are not claiming that UNDROP will be read to the detriment of UNDRIP, which article 28(1) forecloses. They are claiming that the habit of naming both subjects within a single phrase produces, in the practice of States and of international organizations, an equating effect that no savings clause manages to correct. That warning seems to me well founded, and a purely legal answer does not touch it. What I argue is that the effect is produced by the pairing found in the biodiversity texts, quoted daily in forums, reports and programmes of work until it hardens into an acronym, and not by a provision on scope of application that names Indigenous Peoples inside a five-element list and that almost nobody invokes.

2.

A FORMULA ITS OWN REGIME DECLINED TO ENDOW WITH EFFECTS

Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity obliges States, “subject to its national legislation”, to respect, preserve and maintain “knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”.⁹ Two features define the subject: a traditional lifestyle, and its relevance for conservation. The clause then subordinates the whole obligation to the domestic law of the State. The human collective is therefore defined by what it contributes to the ecosystem, and protected to the extent that national legislation permits.

From this comes the reproach now being made. The category of “local communities” was born in 1992 as an instrument for managing resources and not as the status of a subject of rights, and that birthmark has never been removed.

The decisive evidence for the contrast lies in the practice of the Convention itself. When the Conference of the Parties decided in 2014 to use “indigenous peoples and local communities” in its decisions and secondary documents, it surrounded the change with unusual safeguards: the



new usage “shall not affect in any way the legal meaning of Article 8(j) and related provisions”, it may not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights or obligations of Parties, it constitutes neither context for the purposes of treaty interpretation nor subsequent practice, and it is adopted on an exceptional basis.¹⁰

It is necessary to be exact about the reach of that disclaimer, because it says less than it appears to say and something rather more interesting. The same decision adds that any change to the legal meaning of the expression would have to be made through the amendment procedure of article 29 of the Convention, which presupposes that such a meaning exists. The Conference of the Parties did not declare that the formula was devoid of legal content; it declared that it was not itself authorized to touch that content. What the episode does show serves the argument equally well: in thirty years the regime never attributed to “local communities” a catalogue of rights of their own, and when it wished to change the name of the subject it had to wrap the operation in safeguards clarifying that it was not changing the subject's legal position.

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And yet the same regime widens its roster of subjects when it considers this necessary. In Cali, on 1 November 2024, decision 16/6 invited Parties to recognize the contributions of people of African descent “comprising collectives embodying traditional lifestyles”, with the express proviso that nothing in such recognition may be construed as “diminishing or extinguishing the rights that indigenous peoples currently have or may acquire in future”.¹¹ Widening the roster and shielding the indigenous flank in the same act: the drafting technique is exactly the one UNDROP had used six years earlier, and for which it is now reproached.

The parallel is in fact tighter than it looks, and anyone with both texts open can check it. The savings formula of decision 16/6 reproduces almost word for word the wording of article 28(1) of the revised UNDROP draft of February 2018, which read that nothing in the declaration “may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights that peasants and other people working in rural areas currently have or may acquire in the future”.¹² The same clause, celebrated in Cali as an achievement for people of African descent, is read in Geneva as evidence of dilution.

I do not want to push the analogy further than it goes. Decision 16/6 names a determinate subject and describes it, whereas article 1(3) adds a category that no instrument defines, and that difference is real. What the comparison proves is something narrower, and it suffices: the operation



of widening and safeguarding in a single act was performed in Cali in 2024 and was celebrated there as a gain; performed in Geneva in 2018, it is read today as a manoeuvre against Indigenous Peoples.

That same conference left an asymmetry behind it. The biodiversity regime opened in 2024 to people of African descent and left the peasantry outside. The permanent subsidiary body on article 8(j) was born with the pairing intact and with a mandate confined to indigenous peoples and local communities.¹³ The peasant subject of UNDROP, which by 2024 had six years of legal existence behind it, obtained no place of its own on the biodiversity agenda.



3.

THREE STATES OF A TEXT

The discussion of article 1(3) of UNDROP has so far been conducted on the terrain of interpretation. The three successive states of the text, however, allow it to be moved onto documentary terrain, which is less comfortable for anyone wishing to argue that the clause was an oversight.

The first draft of UNDROP dates from 2012 and was prepared by the Advisory Committee of the Human Rights Council. Its article 1(1) defined the peasant with this sentence: “Peasants are traditionally embedded in their local communities and they take care of local landscapes and of agro-ecological systems”. And its article 1(2) closed the list of occupations with a clarification that has not changed since: “This includes indigenous people working on the land”.¹⁴ The expression “local communities” enters the lineage of UNDROP inside the very definition of the peasant, in order to name the social fabric in which the peasant is embedded.

In my view that first use proves nothing about the function the formula performs in the 2018 text, because the two are different constructions: there it is a predicate about peasants, here it is one element in a list of addressees. What it does prove is that the formula did not arrive in the peasant instrument imported from the vocabulary of conservation. It was in the lineage, doing another job, six years before the final round of negotiation.

The same study left a record of something the current controversy would do well to recall. Presenting its proposal, the Advisory Committee wrote that the structure of the peasant declaration follows that of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.¹⁵ The peasant instrument was therefore designed taking UNDRIP as its model, and its 2012 preamble affirmed the right of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination and spoke of “indigenous peasants” as a reality rather than a contradiction.



The second antecedent is the revised draft submitted by the Chair-Rapporteur on 12 February 2018 for the fifth and final session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group. Its article 1(3) read: “The present declaration also applies to indigenous peoples working on the land, transhumant, nomadic and semi-nomadic communities, and the landless”. Without “local communities”. And its article 28(1) read: “Nothing in the present declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights that peasants and other people working in rural areas currently have or may acquire in the future”. Without “indigenous peoples”.¹⁶

The third input is the adopted text. In article 1(3) the words “and local communities” were inserted, and the closing clause was qualified, from “and the landless” to “and the landless engaged in the above-mentioned activities”. Article 28(1) came to read “peasants and other people working in rural areas and indigenous peoples”, and replaced “diminishing or extinguishing” with “diminishing, impairing or nullifying”.¹⁷ Table 1 sets out the changes.

TABLE 1. CHANGES BETWEEN THE REVISED DRAFT AND THE ADOPTED TEXT

Provision	Revised draft, 12 February 2018	Adopted text, 28 September 2018
Article 1(3)	“indigenous peoples working on the land”	“indigenous peoples and local communities working on the land”
Article 1(3), closing clause	“and the landless”	“and the landless engaged in the above-mentioned activities”
Article 28(1), subjects	“peasants and other people working in rural areas”	“peasants and other people working in rural areas and indigenous peoples”
Article 28(1), verbs	“diminishing or extinguishing”	“diminishing, impairing or nullifying”
Article 2(3), deference formula	“Without disregarding specific legislation on indigenous peoples”	Unchanged. The hardening of this clause appears only in the Spanish versions.

Source: prepared by the author on the basis of A/HRC/WG.15/5/2 and Human Rights Council resolution 39/12. All quotations follow the English originals.

A caveat on the English and Spanish versions belongs here, since it corrects a point I had made in an earlier Spanish version of this paper. Article 2(3) of UNDROP is often cited as a fourth reinforcement, on the ground that its deference formula hardened between draft and adoption. In



the Spanish versions this is so, from “sin olvidar” to “sin perjuicio de”. In the English originals it is not: both the revised draft and the adopted text open with “Without disregarding specific legislation on indigenous peoples”, word for word.¹⁸ The hardening exists in the Spanish translation and cannot be attributed to the negotiation. I record it because an argument built on documentary evidence has to survive being checked against every language version, and because the divergence itself deserves attention: on this point the Spanish text of UNDROP protects indigenous legislation more firmly than the English one, and the two are equally authentic.

Of the four changes actually introduced into the English text in the final round, two reinforce the position of Indigenous Peoples, both in article 28(1); one qualifies the reach of the landless clause; and one widens the personal scope of UNDROP towards rural collectives that are neither peasants in the strict sense nor Indigenous.

It is worth being precise about what the table proves and what it does not. The records of the fifth session are not available, so I could not say who proposed each amendment or what was said in the room. What the cited documents do establish is that the two decisive modifications, the widening of article 1(3) and the reinforcement of article 28(1), were introduced in the same round, between February and September 2018. It does not follow that they were a package concerted by the same actors. What follows is more modest and sufficient: the widening of the personal scope was deliberate and contemporaneous with the strengthening of the indigenous safeguard. It may have been a coherent design or it may have been a trade-off, and it is hard to know which; the point worth making is that neither hypothesis indicates an oversight. Nobody widens the personal scope of a declaration by inadvertence.

■ *Nobody widens the personal scope of a declaration by inadvertence.*

The semantic key lies in the preamble, which survived intact from earlier rounds. There the text lists the factors that make it difficult for vulnerable rural communities to have their voices heard and to defend their rights, naming “peasants and other people working in rural areas, including small-scale fishers and fish workers, pastoralists, foresters and other local communities”.¹⁹

The word “other” does all the work. The small-scale fishers, pastoralists and foresters just named are already local communities for the purposes of this text. The formula closes a list of rural occupations. These are therefore not the same “local communities” that appear in the conservation setting of article 8(j) of the Convention.



That is the sense article 1(3) inherits, and it explains its legal effect, which is anti-exclusionary. The provision prevents a State from arguing that a rural collective falls outside UNDROP because it does not fit the strict definition of article 1(1). In none of the twenty-eight provisions of UNDROP is a right attributed to local communities as such, and anyone can verify this by opening the text of the Declaration.

One objection has to be answered before going further.

If article 1(1) defines the peasant broadly, expressly covering anyone who engages “alone, or in association with others or as a community” in small-scale agricultural production, and if article 1(2) extends the Declaration to those engaged in livestock raising, pastoralism, fishing, forestry, hunting or gathering, then one may reasonably ask what article 1(3) adds. If it added nothing, removing it would cost nothing, and everything I have been arguing collapses.

The answer lies in the cumulative conditions of paragraph 1. To be a peasant within the meaning of article 1(1) a person must engage in small-scale production for subsistence or for the market, rely significantly on family or household labour or other non-monetized ways of organizing labour, and have a special dependency on and attachment to the land. Paragraph 2 defines by occupation, and applies to “any person engaged in” a list of activities.²⁰ A collective whose relationship with land, or with water, is one of stewardship of a common resource, and whose existence is not organized around production or around an occupation, may enter through neither route. Paragraph 3 is the only one of the three that reaches a collective for what it is, by identification, rather than for what it produces.

There is, besides, an internal test that saves the argument some work. If article 1(3) added nothing to the preceding paragraphs, then neither would the mention of Indigenous Peoples add anything, since it appears in that same provision and nobody has proposed removing it. Those who object to the clause treat it, in the same movement, as a provision with effects. One cannot hold at once that article 1(3) is inert when it names local communities and significant when it names Indigenous Peoples.



4.

FOUR FUNCTIONS AND A TEST

To move from impression to data I reviewed, with the assistance of artificial intelligence, the occurrences of the formula “local communities” in the Convention on Biological Diversity and its lead decisions, in the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, in UNDROP and in the two Cartagena texts, classifying each occurrence according to what the expression does in the provision where it appears. I counted lead provisions rather than isolated mentions, because counting every mention across thirty years of Convention decisions would inflate the figure without adding information.

The exercise let me distinguish four functions. The denominative function constitutes the holder of a right, a power or an obligation. The delimiting function defines who the instrument reaches, without attributing any legal position of its own. The enumerative function closes a list of rural collectives in a preambular or political text, with no autonomous effect. And the adjectival function, as in “local markets” or “local knowledge”, does not belong to this debate; I record it conceptually only so as not to inflate the count.

The result is sharper than I expected. In the Convention and in the Global Framework the occurrences are denominative without exception, including the seven Kunming-Montreal targets that name the pairing. In UNDROP there is no denominative occurrence at all: one is delimiting, that of article 1(3); one is enumerative, that of the preamble; and three are adjectival.

In the intergovernmental Cartagena declaration, for its part, there are twelve occurrences, all enumerative, nearly all within one repeated formula: “peasants, smallholders, rural workers, Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities”.²¹

That last figure forces a precision the discussion has been neglecting. In Cartagena the term did not replace Indigenous Peoples. It appeared alongside them, twelve times, one after the other. What is being objected to, then, is a juxtaposition of the kind the system has popularized into an acronym. The distinction matters because it changes what correction is possible: against a substitution one asks for the name to be restored, whereas against a juxtaposition the appropriate remedy is to separate the regimes, which is slower and more laborious work.

The criticism holds where the formula occupies the place of a rights holder, and does not hold where it delimits who an instrument reaches.



From this distribution follows a test that can be used in a negotiating room. The criticism holds where the formula occupies the place of a rights holder, and does not hold where it delimits who an instrument reaches. Applied to the case at hand, it makes it possible to request the correction of the pairing in the biodiversity texts without dragging article 1(3) of UNDROP along with it.

5.

WHAT THE CASE LAW SAYS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT

Inter-American law offers useful criteria for these conceptual discussions. Two examples make the point. In the Saramaka People case the Inter-American Court found that the Saramaka are not indigenous to the region they inhabit, having been brought to present-day Suriname during the colonial period, and nonetheless recognized reinforced protection over their territory because they “make up a tribal community whose social, cultural and economic characteristics are different from other sections of the national community, particularly because of their special relationship with their ancestral territories, and because they regulate themselves, at least partially, by their own norms, customs, and/or traditions”.²² Protection follows from the intensity of the collective bond with the territory, not from an ethnic label.

That criterion is the bridge towards non-indigenous rural collectives, and one has to say how far it reaches. The category the Court employs is that of tribal people, and the Latin American peasantry, as a general matter, does not satisfy it. Stretching Saramaka to cover the peasantry would be an overextension, and whoever attempts it in litigation will lose. What the case does prove is that the legally relevant question is what relationship a collective maintains with its territory, and not what it is called.

The Lhaka Honhat case shows the problem in its most complex form. Plots 14 and 55 of the Salta Chaco are inhabited by indigenous communities and also by more than four hundred and sixty-five criollo families, small subsistence producers engaged chiefly in livestock raising, whose presence dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century. The Court recognized that this population, without being a formal party to the proceedings, was a material party to the substantive conflict over the use and ownership of the land, and ordered measures that had to take it into account.²³ It dissolved no one into a common formula; it named each collective for what it is and settled the terms of coexistence. That, it seems to me, is the model international governance needs, rather than an umbrella category that spares the work of distinguishing.



Something comparable happened in Colombian domestic law through constitutional amendment. Legislative Act 01 of 2023 recognized the peasantry as a subject of special constitutional protection.²⁴ The solution was not to widen an existing category until the whole rural world fitted inside it. It was to create the name that was missing.

A gap remains, however, and I want to name it. Neither the inter-American nor the African system has yet resolved what collective protection is owed to non-indigenous, non-tribal rural collectives that maintain a constitutive relationship with their territory. UNDROP filled part of that gap at the normative level, without the case law having caught up with it. There is an agenda there for research and for strategic litigation over the coming years.



6.

YEREVAN

The seventeenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties will be held in Yerevan from 19 to 30 October 2026.²⁵ It arrives with the permanent subsidiary body on article 8(j) beginning to function, with a programme of work setting priorities up to 2030, and with sustained pressure from the indigenous mechanisms for the system to abandon the pairing.

Much of that pressure is justified, and section 2 of this paper explains why.

The test I propose can be stated in a few lines. Wherever the expression “local communities” occupies the place of a rights holder, the criticism made by the indigenous mechanisms is well founded and the system should act on it, beginning with targets 21 and 22 of the Global Framework.

But wherever the expression delimits the personal scope of an instrument that attributes its rights to a different subject, as in article 1(3) of UNDROP, the criticism does not apply, and removing the words would protect nobody. It would instead leave without cover those rural collectives that work the land without calling themselves peasants or Indigenous, who are numerous in Africa, in Latin America and especially the Caribbean, and in Asia, and who were precisely the reason the clause was inserted.

Let me spell out what that proposal implies. If the pairing “local communities” is struck from targets 21 and 22, the non-indigenous rural collectives currently covered by the expression lose, within the Global Framework, free, prior and informed consent and the recognition of rights over lands, territories and resources. That effect is not acceptable, and this is why what I propose is not deletion as such.



What is called for is named substitution: where the text now reads “indigenous peoples and local communities”, let it read “indigenous peoples” and, in a separate provision, peasants and other people working in rural areas, tribal peoples, people of African descent comprising collectives embodying traditional lifestyles, and small-scale fishers, each with a cross-reference to the instrument that already recognizes them.

Separating the regimes admittedly takes more drafting work than deleting a formula, but it is the only way for terminological correction not to be paid for with the rights of third parties.

Four concrete consequences follow.

First, for the Secretariat of the Convention and for the Parties: the terminological revision to be discussed in Yerevan should be confined to the instruments where the formula performs a denominative function, and should say so in the text of the decision. A decision drafted in general terms about the use of the expression “local communities” across the United Nations system would produce effects on human rights instruments that the Conference of the Parties has no mandate to interpret.

Second, for the new subsidiary body: its programme of work should distinguish between rights holding and scope of application, and should open an item on articulation with the agrarian agenda. Decision 16/6 opened the regime to people of African descent in 2024. The peasantry still has no place of its own, and the rights to water, to seeds and to biodiversity that UNDROP recognizes are precisely those that keep conservation from turning into a new form of dispossession.

Third, for peasant organizations and for the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty: the formulation adopted in Cartagena, which condemns the concept of “local communities” and not merely its conflation with Indigenous Peoples, carries a cost that does not appear to have been measured. Read literally, it reaches article 1(3) of UNDROP, in the same document that demands that no decision representing a regression in recognized rights be accepted.²⁶

Fourth, for the human rights mechanisms, including the Working Group of which I am a member: the position we have maintained, that UNDROP and UNDRIP are not adversarial instruments, now has documentary support and not only doctrinal support. The peasant declaration was built from 2012 taking the indigenous declaration as its structural model, and its final text strengthened the safeguard of indigenous rights in the same round in which it widened its own reach.²⁷



What is at stake can be put plainly. Indigenous Peoples have spent four decades demanding that the international system do the work of distinguishing between rural collective subjects, and they are right to demand it. The peasantry obtained that work in 2018, in an instrument that now risks losing part of its reach through a transposition of criticism that very few people have examined with the text in front of them.



NOTES

2. Political Declaration: Closing Session ICARRD+20, Cartagena de Indias, 28 February 2026.
3. Human Rights Council resolution 39/12 of 28 September 2018, and General Assembly resolution 73/165 of 17 December 2018, annex, article 1, paragraph 3.
4. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples and Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, joint statement on the use of the term “local communities”, July 2023.
5. Albert K. Barume, Recognition of Indigenous Peoples, report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, A/HRC/60/29, submitted to the Human Rights Council on 29 August 2025.
6. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, Communication 276/2003, decision adopted at the 46th ordinary session, November 2009.
7. Land Is Life, “10 Reasons why indigenous peoples should not be conflated with the term local communities”, 17 October 2024.
8. Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, decision 15/4 of the Conference of the Parties, targets 21 and 22. The formula also appears in targets 1, 3, 5, 9 and 19.
9. Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, article 8(j).
10. Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, decision XII/12, section F, Pyeongchang, 2014.
11. Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, decision 16/6, on the role of people of African descent in the implementation of the Convention, Cali, 1 November 2024, paragraph 1.
12. Compare decision 16/6, paragraph 1, with A/HRC/WG.15/5/2, article 28, paragraph 1. The coincidence is textual and is verifiable against both documents; I do not claim any causal link between the two drafting processes.
13. CBD/COP/16/L.6, draft decision on the establishment of a subsidiary body on article 8(j) and other provisions of the Convention, Cali, 30 October 2024.
14. Final study of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on the advancement of the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas, A/HRC/19/75, 24 February 2012, annex, article 1, paragraphs 1 and 2. The annex was published in English only.
15. A/HRC/19/75, paragraph 72.
16. Revised draft United Nations declaration on the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas, A/HRC/WG.15/5/2, 12 February 2018, submitted to the fifth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group, held from 9 to 13 April 2018. The Spanish version of the document carries the year 2017 on its cover in error.
17. General Assembly resolution 73/165, annex, articles 1(3), 2(3) and 28(1). Available at <https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/73/165>.
18. A/HRC/WG.15/5/2, article 2, paragraph 3, and General Assembly resolution 73/165, annex, article 2, paragraph 3. Both English texts open with the same words. The Spanish versions read “sin olvidar” in the draft and “sin perjuicio de” in the adopted text.



19. General Assembly resolution 73/165, annex, preamble.
20. General Assembly resolution 73/165, annex, article 1, paragraphs 1 and 2.
21. Final Declaration of the Second International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD+20), Cartagena de Indias, 24 to 28 February 2026.
22. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, judgment of 28 November 2007, Series C No. 172, paragraphs 79 and 84.
23. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat Association (Our Land) v. Argentina, judgment of 6 February 2020, Series C No. 400.
24. Legislative Act 01 of 2023 of 5 July 2023, recognizing the peasantry as a subject of special constitutional protection, Colombia.
25. The seventeenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity will be held in Yerevan, Armenia, from 19 to 30 October 2026.
26. Political Declaration: Closing Session ICARRD+20, cited in note 2.
27. Working Group on the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas, The right to participation of peasants, A/80/180, 26 August 2025.



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